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The Kathåvatthu and the Vijñånakåya share two topics of discussion: the existence of the 
pudgala and the existence of past and future. Both texts agree in rejecting the existence of the 
pudgala, using to some extent the same arguments. They disagree where the existence of past 
and future is concerned: they do not exist according to the Kathåvatthu, according to the 
Vijñånakåya they do exist. The latter text ascribes the mistaken idea that past and future do 
not exist to someone called Maudgalyåyana. 
 It seems at first sight plausible to identify this Maudgalyåyana with the presumed 
promulgator of the Kathåvatthu, described as Moggaliputta Tissa by the Påli sources. 
According to these same sources, Moggaliputta played a leading role in the Council of 
På†aliputra, where the Vibhajyavådins — read Theravådins — expelled certain heretics. If we 
assume that these heretics included the Sarvåstivådins, we get the following picture: The 
Kathåvatthu, or at least the portion that contains the two topics of discussion mentioned 
above, was composed soon after the Council of På†aliputra in order to refute the expelled 
heretics; the Vijñånakåya was composed subsequently to answer the arguments of 
Moggaliputta, i.e., of the Kathåvatthu.1 
 However, this picture is hard to reconcile with the wording of our two texts. Consider 
first the existence of past and future as discussed in the Vijñånakåya. This text presents a 
number of arguments which differ but little from each other. They all centre around one 
fundamental assumption, viz., that in one single person (pudgala) two mental events cannot 
simultaneously take place. For example, when an object is observed which is itself of a mental 
nature, e.g., desire, the mental event which is the object of perception and the one that is its 
subject cannot simultaneously exist. In this situation one is forced to admit that something 
non-present exists, or else that no such perception is possible, which is against the scriptures. 
[58] 
 These arguments make sense, and there is no reason to doubt that they played a role 
among the Sarvåstivådins from an early date onward. Yet the Kathåvatthu ignores them 
completely. There is even reason to think that it did not know them. In the section I.6.23 f. this 
text argues that if all conditions for perception — i.e., in the case of vision, the eye, visible 
objects, eye-consciousness, light and attention — exist in the past, perception of past objects 
with a past sense-organ should take place, which is absurd. A similar argument applies to the 
perception of future objects with a future sense-organ. In the course of this discussion it 
                                                           
1 This view was held, e.g., by E. Frauwallner (1952: 667). 
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becomes clear that only perception of present objects with a present sense-organ is acceptable 
to the Kathåvatthu and to its opponent. This explicitly stated to be true also of the perception 
of dhammas by the mind (mana): only present dhammas are cognized by the present mind. 
 But this shows that the author of this part of the Kathåvatthu did not know the line of 
reasoning which we find in the Vijñånakåya. The traditional account, according to which the 
author of the Kathåvatthu himself confronted the heretics and investigated their doctrines, 
seems difficult to maintain in the face of so much ignorance. 
 Let us now consider the discussion regarding the existence of the pudgala in our two 
texts. The Vijñånakåya rejects the pudgala in its second Skandhaka; the discussion consists of 
the following clearly distinguishable parts: 
(i) One and the same pudgala cannot at one time be one thing, say an inhabitant of hell, 
and at another time something different, say an animal; this argument is repeated with many 
variations (II. I. 1-42; p. 537a l. 27 – p. 542b l. 5). 
(ii) The acceptance of a pudgala entails certain unacceptable views (II. I. 5-6; p. 542b l. 6 – 
p. 543c l. 1). 
(iii) The object of benevolence (maitr¥) is not the pudgala (II. II. 1-4; p. 543c l. 2 – p. 545b 
l. 12). 
(iv) The pudgala is neither saµsk®ta nor asaµsk®ta, and as a result it cannot exist (II. II. 5; 
p. 545b l. 13-19). 
(v) No pudgala is observed (II. III. 1-4; p. 545b l. 20 f.).3 
 The most interesting among these parts, for our present purposes, is (iii), which deals 
with the object of benevolence. In this part, and only here, the ÍËnyavådin (the name which is 
here reserved for the denier of [59] the pudgala) is attacked by the Pudgalavådin; this is then 
followed by an answer to this attack. One has in this case the impression that the author of the 
Vijñånakåya had before him a text of the Pudgalavådins in which they claimed that 
benevolence requires a pudgala as object, since it could not possibly be directed toward the 
five skandhas. The ÍËnyavådin replies by describing the mechanism of knowledge and the 
like, which leaves no place for a being (sattva) as object of benevolence. Also part (v) is of 
interest. The extensive discussion of the process of knowledge and of what is known seems 
meant to answer the claim that the pudgala can be perceived. 
 It seems safe here to conclude that the author of the Vijñånakåya made an effort to 
answer concrete ‘proofs’ of the existence of a pudgala, and responded, in all probability, 
directly to a text of the Pudgalavådins. At the same time it is clear that the two parts (iii) and 
(v) are primarily ‘defensive’ and are by themselves far weaker arguments against the existence 
of a pudgala than the remaining parts (i), (ii) and (iv). 
 The Kathåvatthu contains sections that correspond to parts (i), (ii) and (iv) of the 
Vijñånakåya,4 but none corresponding to (iii) and (v).5 It is true that it contains much else 
                                                           
2 I use the divisions introduced by La Vallée Poussin (1925) in his translation. 
3 It is not exactly clear where the discussion of the pudgala ends. Certainly the last part of the second chapter (the 
Pudgalaskandha) belongs really to the third one; see La Vallée Poussin, 1925: 376 n. 1. 
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pertaining to the question of the existence of the pudgala, but much of this makes the 
impression of being exercises in logic, which indeed they may have been.6 The conclusion 
must be that the Kathåvatthu could afford to ignore the arguments of the Pudgalavådins and 
concentrate on its own refutation of the latter’s point of view. This in its turn seems to show 
that the confrontation between Kathåvatthu and Pudgalavådins was less direct. Again we are 
led to believe that the author of the Kathåvatthu had never himself confronted the opponents 
he criticizes. 
 The evidence we have considered so far seems to agree with Bechert’s convincing 
analysis (1961) of the Pali passages that describe the Council of På†aliputra, where 
Moggaliputta supposedly played a major role. The Council, we learn from this analysis, was 
not concerned with doctrinal differences among the Buddhists; those who were expelled were 
rather monks who did not live in accordance with the rules of Vinaya. The Kathåvatthu — or 
its oldest parts — may have been [60] composed when, after this purification of the sangha of 
the Asokåråma in På†aliputra, the remaining community of monks of this monastery decided 
to write down its positions regarding the points of dispute that existed between the nikåyas. 
No direct confrontation with the upholders of the alternative doctrines, nor indeed any 
profound knowledge of these doctrines is now to be assumed on the part of the author or 
authors of the original Kathåvatthu. 
 But if the Kathåvatthu was indeed a local product of the Asokåråma in På†aliputra, 
which does not presuppose more than superficial contact with, or even knowledge of the 
opposed doctrines, it is less than self-evident that the Vijñånakåya should react to it. We have 
seen, on the contrary, that where the existence of the pudgala is concerned, the Vijñånakåya 
appears to react to a text, or to arguments, of the Pudgalavådins. What is more, one gains the 
impression that the Kathåvatthu borrowed some of the arguments of the Vijñånakåya, leaving 
out others. 
 With regard to the discussion of the existence of past and future the situation is slightly 
more complicated. If it is true that the Vijñånakåya presents the original arguments of the 
Sarvåstivådins, and I see no reason to doubt this, it is hard to see why it should react to a 
sectarian work like the Kathåvatthu which had completely missed the point of these 
arguments. 
 Few certain conclusions can be drawn from the above observations. The exact 
relationship between Kathåvatthu and Vijñånakåya remains obscure. But one thing seems 
certain: these portions of the Kathåvatthu were not written in direct exchange of views with 
the opponents. Rather than representing a direct confrontation of different views, these 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
4 Vk part (i) : Kv 1.1.155, 158-170, 180-182, 219-224. 
Vk part (ii) : Kv 1.1.212. 
Vk part (iv) : Kv 1.1.225-227. 
5 Kv 1.1.199 answers briefly the view that the Buddha  sees the puggala. 
6 See Watanabe, 1983: 154 f., who refers to A. K. Warder’s article “The earliest Indian logic” (Proceedings of the 
25th International Congress of Orientalists, 1963, vol. 4, pp. 56-68). 
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portions of the Kathåvatthu attack alternative points of view without heeding, or even 





Aung, Shwe Zan, and Rhys Davids, C. A. F. (tr.)(1915): Points of Controversy or Subjects of 
Discourse (Kathåvatthu). London: Pali Text Society. (PTS Translation Series No. 5.) 
Bechert, H. (1961): “Aßoka’s ‘Schismenedikt’ und der Begriff Sanghabheda”. Wiener 
Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 5, 18-52. 
Frauwallner, Erich (1952): “Die buddhistischen Konzile.” (Zeitschrift der Deutschen 
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 102, 240-261). Kleine Schriften (Wiesbaden 1982) p. 
649-670. 
Kathåvatthu. Pali Text Society ed. by Arnold C. Taylor. Vol. I. London. 1894. For a 
translation see Aung and Rhys Davids, 1915. 
[61] 
La Vallée Poussin, Louis de (1925): “La controverse du temps et du Pudgala dans le 
Vijñånakåya.” Études Asiatiques I. (Publ. EFEO, Vol. 29). Pp. 343-376. 
Vijñånakåya = T. 1539 (tome 26). For a French translation of the first two chapters see La 
Vallée Poussin, 1925. 
Watanabe, Fumimaro (1983): Philosophy and its Development in the Nikåyas and 
Abhidhamma. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
